What factors/operations contributed to tincident? As the safety and health program manager, what recommendations would you make in order to prevent similar incidents? What standards and regulation, if any apply to thtypes of operations?

Paper detailsStudent InstructionAfter reading the case study thoroughly, write a three to four page paper with your analysis of the problem, your conclusions of the cause and your suggestions for how to prevent tfrom occurring on other similar incidents. The following discussion points should assist you: What factors/operations contributed to tincident? As the safety and health program manager, what recommendations would you make in order to prevent similar incidents? What standards and regulation, if any apply to thtypes of operations? All case study reports must comply with the Publication Manual of the American Psychological Association (APA), 6th. Ed. for writing conventions, organization, and formatting. ??.. CASE STUDY 4InstructionsAll case study reports must comply with the Publication Manual of the American Psychological Association (APA), Sixth Edition for writing conventions, organization, and formatting.After thoroughly reading the following case study, write a three to four page paper with your analysis of the problem, your conclusions of the cause and your suggestions for how to prevent tfrom occurring on other similar incidents. The following discussion points should assist you:What factors/operations contributed to tincident? As the safety and health program manager, what recommendations would you make in order to prevent similar incidents? What standards and regulation, if any apply to thtypes of operations?Incident DescriptionOn October 27, 1997, two male firefighters, victims 1 and 2, ages 43- and 27-years respectfully entered the right side of a twin dwelling (the left side was not occupied) that had smoke emitting from the basement window. The two firefighters entered the dwelling through the front door, went into the living room, then the breakfast room, and down the stairs to the basement. Approximately 30 minutes later, both firefighters were found in the breakfast room, unresponsive. On October 29, 1997, the International Association of Fire Fighters (IAFF) requested that NIOSH provide technical assistance in reviewing the circumstances surrounding thfatalities. On November 24, 1997, the Chief Trauma Investigations Section, and a Safety Specialist conducted an investigation of tincident. Meetings were conducted with the Fire Commissioner and staff, firefighters responding to the incident, and the IAFF union representative, and attorney for the union. Copies of photographs of the incident site were obtained from the fire department along with an estimated time line of the incident, and a site visit was conducted.The fire department involved in the incident serves a population of 1.4 million in a geographic area of 129 square miles. The fire department is comprised of 2,515 employees, of whom 2,387 are firefighters. The fire department provides all new firefighters with a 71-day training program at their fire academy that is designed to cover all areas of fire department operation, including tools and equipment, ladder operations, search and rescue, emergency medical training, and facility maintenance. The fire department?s written standard operating procedumanual was reviewed and appeared to be complete. The victims had 21 years fire fighting experience and 6 months experience, respectively.Incident AnalysisOn October 27, 1997, Engine Company 63 (a Lieutenant and 3 firefighters) was dispatched at 0028 hours in response to a 911 call regarding a downed power line in a residential neighborhood. They arrived on the scene at 0032 hours and proceeded to rope off the area of the downed power line with barrier tape, and called the power company to report the downed line. One of the firefighters was using a booster line (3/4-inch) to put out small fistarted by the arcing power line. At approximately 0056 hours, the driver of Engine 63 noticed haze smoke emitting from the basement window of the residence that was affected by the downed power line. It was later determined that the broken neutral conductor from the power line had caused and electrical outlet in the dining room of the residence to short circuit. Burning embers from the short circuit fell through the floor into the basement via an opening for electrical conduit, igniting combustible materials in the basement. The owner of the residence was outside when the Lieutenant and two firefighters went to investigate. The owner?s son was upstairs and was led out of the house by one of the firefighters. The Lieutenant (victim 1) and one firefighter (victim 2), using flashlights, proceeded through the light haze visible in the living room into the dining room and breakfast room, and down the stairs to the basement to evaluate the situation, then retreated from the basement to the outside to don their self-contained breathing apparatus (SCBA).At approximately 0107 hours victims 1 and 2 reentered the residence wearing SCBAs. They pulled in a ?-inch booster line and proceeded to the basement to attack the fire. At approximately 0117 hours, firefighter 3, who was feeding line to 1 and 2, returned to the Engine to pull a 1 ?-inch line, and to assist the driver in pulling a 3-inch line and advanced it as far as the dining room before encountering moderate smoke and poor visibility.At 0122 hours, the driver of Engine 63, who remained on the outside to provide a hydrant hook-up and operate the pump, requested a Tactical Box, which consists of one additional pumper (Lieutenant and 3 firefighters), 2 Ladder Trucks (each with one Lieutenant and 4 firefighters), and one Battalion Chief and aide. Twas the first time fire dispatch was alerted as to a possible fire at the residence near the downed power line.At 0125 hours the Battalion Chief arrived on the scene and attempted to call Engine 63 on the portable radio, but received no response. At approximately the same time, Engine 51, Ladder 29, and Ladder 8 arrived on the scene. Two firefighters from Ladder 29 remained on the exterior of the house to perform ventilation while the Lieutenant and two firefighters from Ladder 29 went into the residence to perform a routine primary search. The first firefighter to enter followed the 1 ?-inch line where he located firefighter 3 from Engine 63. The Lieutenant from Ladder 29 also reached firefighter 3 and asked him, Where is your Company? Firefighter 3 stated that he could not find company, but he thought they were in the basement. The Lieutenant stated that at ttime visibility was very poor. One of the firefighters from Ladder 29 proceeded upstairs to break out windows to help vent the residence. The Lieutenant and firefighter from Ladder 29, and firefighter 3 from Engine 63 exited the residence. The firefighter from Ladder 29, who was upstairs venting the residence, returned to the downstairs dining room where he found the nozzle of the 1 ?-inch charged line and saw the booster line going down the steps to the basement. He then decided to return to the second floor, following the 1 ?-inchline, and ran into the Battalion Chief in the living room. The Battalion Chief then radioed on the fire ground band to look for the missing firefighters from Engine 63.At 0142 hours a Full Box was requested, which consists of two more Engines plus another Battalion Chief. Also, at ttime Ladder 29 firefighters were entering the residence from the front, and Engine 51 firefighters were entering the basement from the rear of the residence.During ttime, two firefighters from Ladder 29 entered the front door and proceeded into the breakfast room where they found both firefighters from Engine 63 in a kneeling/crouched position, masks off, and unresponsive. Both downed firefighters, still unresponsive, were removed from the residence. They were transported by EMS to a local hospital where advanced life support failed to revive either firefighter.Since both firefighters were found with their masks off, it can be inferred that they had run out of air and no one herd the low-air alarms. Neither firefighter had turned on personal alert safety system (PASS) device.

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